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THE (FINAL) ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE 
AGREEMENT (ACTA): 
RUTHLESS OR TOOTHLESS? 
 





Secret meetings. Leaked Documents. Freedom of Information Act 
lawsuits. These and other issues have plagued discussions of the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) since news of it hit the media three 
years ago. The U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), an office of the Executive 
branch, has negotiated the agreement with many developed countries, 
including Australia, Canada, the European Union, Japan, Mexico, Morocco, 
New Zealand, Singapore, South Korea, and Switzerland.1 The USTR 
describes the goal of ACTA as working “with trading partners in favor of 
strong IPR enforcement to achieve an agreement that raises the international 
standard for the enforcement of IPR.”2  Although most of the discussions 
between the ACTA parties were secret, the Obama Administration released 
the preliminary draft of the ACTA on April 21, 2010 after much public 
pressure.  The final draft of ACTA was released October 2, 2010. 
In early 2010, a draft of ACTA from the seventh round of negotiations 
held in January in Mexico was leaked over the internet.  The January leaked 
draft proved instructive because it contains the name of parties proposing or 
agreeing to each provision.  Thus, one can glean which countries appear to be 
pursuing various provisions, often controversial, in ACTA by examining the 
                                                 
* J.D., Assistant Professor of Business Law, University of Texas at Tyler. 
1 OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT, CONSOLIDATED 
TEXT (Oct. 2, 2010), http://www.ustr.gov/acta (hereinafter OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., 
ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT, Oct. Text).  More specifically, Australia, Austria, 
Belgium Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Malta, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States are parties to the agreement. 
2 OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., 2010 SPECIAL 301 REPORT at 11 (2010), 
http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/1906. It is notable that the “BRIC” countries – Brazil, 
Russia, India and China and not parties to the ACTA; in fact, India and China have been 
critical of ACTA.  Likewise, Russia, India and China have remained on the Priority Watch List 
in the USTR Special 301 Report for not providing adequate IPR protection or enforcement.  
ACTA would have no effect on these countries. 
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leaked January draft. When the April draft was released by the Obama 
Administration and partner countries, the references to countries was 
omitted.  The April draft does note, by bracketed text, the specific provisions 
that were still under negotiation by the parties.3  The final draft also omits all 
references and contains only minor notations of disputed provisions. 
By examining the leaked January draft, along with the two publicly 
released drafts of ACTA, one can begin to interpret the intentions and 
interests of the parties to the ACTA negotiations.  This paper will discuss 
several provisions of ACTA and its intersection with U. S. copyright law.  
Section II will discuss general provisions of copyright law, section III will 
address the various international intellectual property law treaties, and 
section IV will discuss three main areas addressed by ACTA: criminal 
liability, internet service providers, and technological protection measures. 
Section IV will also discuss how these areas conflict with or advance U.S. 
copyright law. 
 
II. COPYRIGHT LAW BASICS 
 
A. Constitutional Provision 
 
Congress passed the first Copyright Act in 1790; however, the modified 
Copyright Act of 1976 (Copyright Act) is considered the modern basis for 
copyright law in the United States.  Section 102 of the Copyright Act states 
that copyright protection is found in “original works of authorship fixed in 
any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from 
which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either 
directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”4 Among other rights, 
copyright owners are granted the exclusive right to reproduce copyrighted 
works, distribute copies to the public, and display the copyrighted work 
publicly.5  Anyone who uses, or authorizes the use of, copyrighted works 
without the permission of the copyright holder has infringed on the 
copyright, commonly known as direct infringement.6 
 
  
                                                 
3 OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT, Oct. Text, supra 
note 1. 
4 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 USC §102(a) (1976). 
5 Id. at §106. 
6 Id. at §501(a).  (There are certain exceptions to infringement, including fair use). 
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B. Legislative and Judicial Provisions 
 
In addition to statutory direct infringement, the Courts have judicially 
expanded copyright protection over the years through contributory and 
vicarious liability, also known as secondary liability. Contributory 
infringement occurs when one intentionally induces or encourages direct 
infringement, either by personal conduct that furthers the infringement or 
providing the means to infringe.7  Vicarious liability occurs when one profits 
from direct infringement while declining to stop or limit the infringement.8  
Notably, neither intent nor knowledge of infringement is required with 
vicarious copyright liability. 
This expansion was greatly affected by the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., where the 
Supreme Court adopted the “staple article of commerce” doctrine from 
patent law in determining whether Sony’s sale of the Betamax recorder 
constituted contributory copyright infringement.9  The court found that Sony 
was not liable for contributory infringement since its Betamax was capable of 
substantial non-infringing uses.10  This ruling created a well-known “safe 
harbor” defense for companies upon a showing that a new technology has 
legitimate purposes, even though it can also be used to commit copyright 
infringement. 
Then along came Napster.  This peer-to-peer file sharing system 
provided software to users that allowed them to download and exchange 
MP3 music files.  Napster maintained a central server which indexed all of 
the files available from other users.  Users could also search the indexes for 
music they wished to download.  When major music companies filed suit 
against Napster, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals seemed to have little 
difficulty deciding that Napster had committed contributory copyright 
infringement.11  The Court relied primarily on Napster’s knowledge of the 
infringement based on internal emails and notices provided by the Recording 
Industry Association of America (RIAA).12  The Court further found that the 
centralized servers provided the means to infringe on the Plaintiff’s 
copyrights, thus nailing the coffin shut on Napster. 
The next wave of peer-to-peer systems utilized decentralized servers – 
these were true peer-to-peer systems – which theoretically would escape the 
                                                 
7 Gershwin Pub. Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt. Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971). 
8 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc., v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913, 930 (2005). 
9 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 440 (1984). 
10 Id. 
11 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
12 Darrin Henning, The Big Chill: The Supreme Court Adopts an Inducement Standard for 
Third-Party Copyright Infringement Liability, Leaving Innovation in the Cold, 29 U. ARK. 
LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 165, 189 (2007). 
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“means to infringe” problems created by Napster.  These systems allowed 
users to download the software necessary to connect to other peers; however, 
the software distributor (Grokster, StreamCast, eDonkey) did not maintain 
any information on a central server.  Ultimately, the major record labels, 
organized by the RIAA, would pursue these companies as well. 
In 2001, the U.S. Supreme Court decided the case of Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., not based on vicarious or contributory 
infringement, but by adding an additional theory of liability from common 
law – the inducement rule.  The Court held that one is liable for secondary 
infringement, under the inducement theory, for distributing a device “with 
the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear 
expression or other affirmative steps.”13 
The facts in this case showed that Grokster and StreamCast distributed 
free software to users after the courts effectively shut down Napster. 
Evidence was introduced at trial that both companies encouraged users to 
download copyrighted works and that they were aware a majority of their 
users were using the software for copyright infringement.14  Even though the 
software was free, both Grokster and StreamCast sold space to advertisers.  
These ads were streamed to users while the software was employed, while 
revenue increased with each additional user.15  Furthermore, StreamCast and 
Grokster made no effort to filter or impede the downloading of copyrighted 
material, and there was evidence of infringement “on a gigantic scale.”16  All 
of these factors provided the Court with ample evidence that StreamCast and 
Grokster intended to profit from third-party acts of infringement in violation 
of the Copyright Act.  The Supreme Court determined that the Ninth Circuit 
had misapplied the Sony case in its opinion below, but declined to address 
the holding in Sony, and its safe-harbor provision, any further.17  This 
decidedly leaves open the question of how Sony’s safe-harbor provision 





The Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) and RIAA have 
been busy the past few years filing suits against individual copyright 
infringers; there is, after all, no safe harbor defense for direct infringement.  
                                                 
13 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc., v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913, 919 (2005). 
14 Id. at 923-24. 
15 Id. at 926. 
16 Id. at 939-40. 




In fact, NPR reports that record companies have filed over 26,000 lawsuits 
for illegal file sharing since 2003.18  In the Jammie Thomas case, the first 
illegal downloading case to get to a jury verdict, the court ordered Thomas, a 
single mother, to pay $222,000 in criminal sanctions for dozens of songs 
downloaded using Kazaa.19  She was granted a new trial, however, and on re-
trial in June of 2009, the jury found her liable for willfully infringing all 24 
copyrights at issue in the case, awarding the record labels $1.92 million in 
damages.20  On a motion for new trial and remittitur, the judge reduced the 
damage award to $54,000, or three times the statutory minimum per sound 
recording infringed.21 
Still other cases involved university students’ use of file-sharing 
programs to download illegal music and movie files. The RIAA was 
particularly successful in litigating these cases, extracting settlements in most 
of them ranging from a few thousand to hundreds of thousands of dollars.22  
However, the music industry announced in 2008 that it would abandon the 
practice of filing suit against large number of individual users, opting instead 
to work with Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to control illegal 
downloading.23  Many say the strategy did not stop illegal downloading and 
tarnished an already negative image for the music labels.24 
In addition to the Jammie Thomas case, there have been criminal cases 
in the United States resulting in jail time for copyright infringement.  For 
example, Grant T. Stanley of Wise, Virginia “was sentenced to five months 
in prison to be followed by five months of home detention for his role in a 
BitTorrent peer-to-peer network.”25 
Even though the use of peer-to-peer file sharing networks to download 
copyrighted material is risky business for individual users, the RIAA and 
                                                 
18 National Public Radio, Minn. Woman to Pay for Illegal Music Downloads, Aug. 5, 2007, 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=15037223. 
19 Id.  The judge granted a new trial based on the jury instruction that “making available” 
copyrighted material constituted distribution. See Mark Hefflinger, Judge Hints at Mistrial in 
Jammie Thomas File-Sharing Case, DIGITAL MEDIA WIRE (Aug. 8, 2008), 
http://www.dmwmedia.com/news/2008/08/05/judge-hints-mistrial-jammie-thomas-file-
sharing-cases. 
20 Capitol Records, Inc. v. Jammie Thomas-Rasset, 680 F.Supp. 2d 1045, 1049 (D.C. Minn. 
2010). 
21 Id. at 1061. The court’s analysis and rationale of using a multiplier of three is interesting but 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
22 Electronic Frontier Foundation, RIAA v. The People: Five Years Later, Sept. 2008, 
http://www.eff.org/wp/riaa-v-people-years-later#3. 
23 Sarah McBride & Ethan Smith, Music Industry to Abandon Mass Suits, WALL ST. J., Dec. 
19, 2008, at B1. 
24 Id. 
25 Heidi Coy, Wise, Virginia Man Sentenced in Peer-To-Peer Piracy Crackdown, Oct. 17, 
2006, Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Western Dist. of Virginia, 
http://www.cybercrime.gov/stanleySent.htm. 
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MPAA’s prospect of litigating these cases appears to be doing little to stem 
the tide of illegal downloads worldwide.  This is evidenced by the RIAA and 
MPAA’s recent push to stop illegal downloading from torrent trackers 
through international political channels. 
 
III. INTERNATIONAL TREATIES AND OTHER ACTIONS 
 
There are three primary international treaties governing copyright law: 
the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Rights, the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS), and the World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty 
of 1996 (WCT).  The Berne Convention made copyright protection available 
for nationals of member states, regardless of whether the work is published.26  
The WCT upgrades the level of protection provided in the Berne Convention.  
TRIPS is the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) agreement on intellectual 
property.  Interestingly, the Berne Convention, Article 20 allows member 
countries to enter into special agreements among themselves as long as they 




Perhaps this is what the Office of the United States Trade 
Representative was thinking of when it, along with other nations, proposed a 
new global standard for intellectual property rights enforcement under the 
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA).  The plans for ACTA were 
discussed at the G8 meeting in Germany in 2007, and announced in general 
terms by then U.S. Trade Ambassador Susan Schwab in October, 2007.28  A 
Discussion Paper, provided to several Intellectual Property lobbyists and 
posted on Wikileaks, cited piracy as a “threat to the sustainable development 
of the world economy.”29 The paper encouraged cooperation with 
international law enforcement groups regardless of where the copyright 
owner or the infringer is located, an obvious nod to the interests of the 
copyright owners.30 
                                                 
26 Roberto Barbosa, Revisiting International Copyright Law, 8 BARRY L. REV. 43, 47 (2007). 
27 Id. at 59. 
28 Wikileaks, Proposed U.S. ACTA Multi-Lateral Intellectual Property Trade Agreement, 
http://wikileaks.org/wiki/Proposed_US_ACTA_plurilateral_intellectual_property_trade_agree
ment%282007%29, (last visited July 31, 2010). 
29 Wikileaks, Discussion Paper on a Possible Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, 
http://file.sunshinepress.org:54445/acta_proposal_2007 (last visited July 31, 2010). 
30 Id.  
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The topic was also discussed at the G8 meeting in Japan in July, 2008.  
The G8 Summit website release stated that the member nations will 
accelerate the establishment of a “new international legal framework, the 
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), and seek to complete the 
negotiation by the end of this year.”31  The European Union published a 
report just before the 2008 G8 summit titled “The Fight against 
Counterfeiting and Piracy in the Bilateral Trade Agreements of the EU.”32 
The EU report cited the goal of creating a higher level of enforcement that 
countries could join on a voluntary basis.  However, even the EU report 
expressed some concern that ACTA could criminalize non-commercial 
copyright infringement.33  
Further insight into the mindset of the U.S. government regarding 
intellectual property right (IPR) issues can be gained from examining the 
Special 301 Reports of USTR, an annual review of IPR protection and 
enforcement in seventy-eight countries.34  The 2008 Report specifically 
referred to ACTA as a “leadership effort among countries that will raise the 
international standard for IPR enforcement to address today’s challenges of 
counterfeiting and piracy.”35  The 2008 Special 301 Report also discussed the 
membership increase in the WIPO treaties.  Once the EU Countries join, 
WIPO will then, according to the Report, represent “a majority world 
community view” such that other treaties and agreements, including TRIPS, 
should be “supplemented to eliminate any remaining gaps in copyright 
protection on the Internet.”36  Furthermore, the United States incorporates the 
WIPO treaties’ standards in its bilateral and regional trade agreements, and 
seeks “accession to those treaties as a substantive obligation under these 
agreements.”37 
Even though the USTR had acknowledged, since 2007, that it was 
involved in plurilateral trade negotiations with other countries over the 
provisions of ACTA, it declined to release the text of ACTA to the public 
because of the need for secrecy in trade negotiations.  But finally, after two 
years of public demand for information on ACTA, various leaks of 
                                                 
31 Press Release, G8 Declaration on the World Economy, Hokkaido Toyako Summit, July 9, 
2008, available at http://ipjustice.org/wp/2008/07/09/g8-declaration-on-the-world-economy/.  
32 Duncan Matthews, The Fight against Counterfeiting and Piracy in the Bilateral Trade 
Agreements of the EU, European Parliament Briefing Paper for Committee on International 
Trade, June 26, 2008, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/committees/studies.do?language=EN. 
33 Id. 
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information, and a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit,38 the USTR released 
the draft text of ACTA to the public on April 21, 2010.39  While the countries 
that participated in the negotiations unanimously agreed to release the draft 
text to the public, the April draft showed that much of the language in the 
agreement was still under debate.  However, a little over five months later, 
the ACTA parties released the final Consolidated Text of the ACTA on 
October 2, 2010.40  While there are a number of controversial issues 
regarding the ACTA, the remainder of the paper will examine three issues 
addressed in the ACTA and compare the force and effect of those provisions 
to existing treaties and U.S. law.41 
 
A. Criminal Infringement 
 
One topic of concern within ACTA is the international definition of 
piracy that would be subject to criminal penalty.  There was initial concern 
that ACTA would circumvent the TRIPS standard for criminal copyright 
infringement, which is based on willful infringement on a commercial 
scale.42  In fact, a Discussion Paper on ACTA notably omitted the “willful” 
requirement with regard to commercial scale infringement.43 
                                                 
38 Grant Gross, EFF, Public Knowledge Sue US Gov’t Over Secret IP Pact, TECHWORLD, 
Sept. 19, 2008. 
http://www.techworld.com.au/article/260892/eff_public_knowledge_sue_us_gov_t_over_secr
et_ip_pact.  The suit was later dropped when the Obama Administration claimed that the 
ACTA negotiations were covered as a state secret.  See Mike Masnick, EFF, Public 
Knowledge Drop ACTA Lawsuit, Realizing “National Secrets” Claim will Block Them, 
TECHDIRT (Jun. 18, 2009) http://www.techdirt.com/article.php?sid=20090617/1918145270. 
39 Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, The Office of the U.S. Trade 
Representative Releases Draft Text of ACTA (Apr. 21, 2010), http://www.ustr.gov/about-
us/press-office/press-releases/2010/april/office-us-trade-representative-releases-draft-text-a. 
40 There is some speculation that the U.S. Chamber of Commerce pushed for conclusion of 
negotiations before the end of the year, or that President Obama wanted the final draft released 
before mid-term elections in November.  See Kaitlin Mara, Civil Society Fights for 
Participation as ACTA Counter to WIPO Rises, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WATCH, Sept. 24, 
2010, http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2010/09/24/civil-society-fights-for-participation-as-
acta-counterpoint-to-wipo-rises/. 
41 A leaked draft of the ACTA dated January, 2010 did reference the name of the countries 
proposing particular provisions.  Reference will be made of both the leaked version and the 
public version for the remainder of the paper to note the country likely responsible for 
proposing a particular provision only. 
42 TRIPS requires criminal procedures and penalties “to be applied at least in cases of willful 
trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a commercial scale.”  See Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Art. 61, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 
299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (hereinafter TRIPS). 
43 See Margot Kaminski, Recent Development: The Origins and Potential Impact of the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 247, 252-53 (2009). 
Fall 2011/Cowart/277 
 
The April draft of ACTA, however, did require criminal penalties to be 
applied “at least in cases of willful trademark counterfeiting or copyright or 
related rights piracy on a commercial scale.”44  Willful piracy on a 
commercial scale is then defined to include: A) significant willful copyright 
or related rights infringement that have no direct or indirect motivation of 
financial gain; and B) willful copyright or related rights infringements for 
purposes of commercial advantage or financial gain.45  Financial gain was 
defined as the “receipt or expectation of anything of value.”46  This appeared 
to push other ACTA parties toward the U.S. standard of criminal copyright 
infringement.  It has been argued that these provisions allow one to be held 
liable for international criminal sanctions for large-scale copyright 
infringement even though the alleged infringer does so for “private” 
purposes.47  This requirement of criminal penalties for copyright 
infringement would go further than TRIPS, which only requires criminal 
penalties for “willful trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a 
commercial scale.”48 
We can assume that this provision addressed some of the legal issues 
encountered by the RIAA, MPAA, and other copyright owners in combating 
the peer-to-peer file sharing networks.  In fact, it was called the Pirate-Bay-
killer proposal by some because of its potential to shut down peer-to-peer 
and torrent sites such as Pirate Bay that do not generate revenue nor have 
servers within the United States.  While these trade groups have had some 
success against individual companies with civil and sometimes criminal 
sanctions, this provision in the April ACTA draft would give them additional 
firepower for their arsenal.49 
The April draft of ACTA also contained a proposal which would require 
criminal sanctions for “inciting, aiding and abetting” willful trademark, 
copyright, or related rights piracy.50  This provision was a European Union 
proposal according to the January leaked draft51 and has no basis in U.S. law. 
                                                 
44 OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT, PUBLIC 
PREDECISIONAL/DELIBERATIVE DRAFT (Apr. 2010) at Art. 2.14, http://www.ustr.gov/acta 
(hereinafter OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT, APR. 
DRAFT). 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at note 37. 
47 Kaminski, supra note 43, at 253.  It is notable that the U.S. and Japan proposed inclusion of 
“private financial gain” in the leaked draft of ACTA, but the word “private” was stricken from 
the public draft. 
48 TRIPS, supra note 42, at Art. 61.  
49 One wonders how this might play out with another Jammie Thomas-type defendant on an 
international stage. 
50 OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT, Apr. Draft, 
supra note 44, at Art. 2.15(2).  
51 ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT, Art. 2.15(2), Informal 
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In 2007, the European Parliament adopted the EU Directive on Criminal 
Measures Aimed at Ensuring the Enforcement of Intellectual Property 
Rights, creating criminal liability for persons who incite copyright 
infringement.52  The European Union text treats “aiding or abetting and 
inciting the actual infringement” as intentional infringement subject to 
criminal penalties.53 After the European Parliament adopted the Directive, 
the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) issued its opinion of 
the Directive, noting “incitement to commit a crime can only be established 
if the inciter supplies the tools for the specific purpose of committing the 
crime.”54 The EESC was also concerned that merely offering access to the 
Internet or providing widely used materials could not constitute criminal 
incitement.55 
Since there was no definition of “incite” in the April draft of ACTA or 
in the EU Directive and no precedent in the U.S. legal system, EU analysis 
would be relevant to how such a provision would be applied or interpreted.  
If this standard were adopted for criminal copyright infringement, it could 
extend secondary copyright infringement for software developers, device 
manufacturers, or ISPs. 
The final October text of ACTA seems to have resolved these issues.  It 
now provides that each country provide criminal penalties in “cases of willful 
trademark counterfeiting or copyright or related rights piracy on a 
commercial scale.”56 This standard is consistent with the criminal 
                                                                                                                   
Predecisional/Deliberative Draft: January 18, 2010, 
http://www.laquadrature.net/files/201001_acta.pdf (hereinafter ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE 
AGREEMENT, Jan. Draft).  A Dutch judge recently order BitTorrent search engine Mininova to 
purge all copyrighted content from its site because Mininova was “inciting copyright 
infringement in others” and profiting through ad sales.  See Nate Anderson, Mininova Ordered 
to Purge All Links to Copyrighted Files, ARSTECHNICA  (Aug. 26, 2009), 
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2009/08/mininova-ordered-to-purge-all-links-to-
copyrighted-files.ars. 
52 Lynda J. Oswald, International Issues in Secondary Liability for Intellectual Property 
Rights Infringement, 45 AM. BUS. L. J. 247, 273 (2008). 
53 Amended Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
Criminal Measures Aimed at Ensuring the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION, COM (2006)0168-C6-0233/2005-
2005/0127(COD) (Apr. 25, 2007), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P6-TA-2007-
0145&format=XML&language=EN#BKMD-12  
54 Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the ‘Proposal for a European 
Parliament and Council Directive on Criminal Measures Aimed at Ensuring the Enforcement 
of Intellectual Property Rights’, EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE, COM (2005) 
276 final (July 12, 2007), http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:256:0003:0007:EN:PDF  
55 Id. 
56 OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT, Oct. Text ,supra 
note 1, at Art. 2.14(1).  Commercial scale would include activity for direct or indirect 
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infringement standard found in TRIPS.57  The same section also requires 
parties to include criminal liability for aiding and abetting, but there is no 
longer any reference to incitement in the agreement.58  This certainly is a 
disappointing outcome for copyright owners, particularly the music and 
movie companies, in their efforts to shut down the peer-to-peer and torrent 
sites in foreign countries which offer file sharing software to users. 
 
B. ISP Responsibility 
 
Another hotly debated provision under the Criminal Liability section of 
ACTA is the provision that requires each party to establish liability for “legal 
persons,” which would include ISPs.59  Several proposals were made in the 
earlier drafts of ACTA with regard to third party liability.  The April draft of 
ACTA required remedies, limitations, exceptions, and defenses for third 
party legal liability.60  Most notable was the footnote definition of third party 
liability, which stated “liability for any person who authorizes for a direct 
financial benefit, induces through or by conduct directed to promoting 
infringement, or knowingly and materially aids any act of copyright or 
related rights infringement by another.”61 
If one looks more closely at the language proposed in the April draft, 
particularly footnote 47, several issues bear further reflection and discussion.  
Footnote 47 purports to extend liability on three different bases.  First, third 
party liability applies to any person who “authorizes for a direct financial 
benefit…any act of copyright or related rights infringement.”62 This 
essentially adopts a vicarious liability theory of copyright infringement, 
which imposes liability when the defendant “profits directly from the 
infringement and has a right and ability to supervise the direct infringer.”63 
Second, the April draft states in footnote 47 that third party liability 
applies for any person who “induces through or by conduct directed to 
promoting infringement…aids any act of copyright or related rights 
                                                                                                                   
economic or commercial advantage. 
57 TRIPS, supra note 42, at Art. 61. 
58 OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT, Oct. Text, supra 
note 1, at Art. 2.14(4). 
59 Id. at Art. 2.14(5). 
60 OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT, Apr. Draft, 
supra note 44, at Art. 2.18 (3). 
61 Id. at note 47. 
62Id. 
63 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc., v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913, 931 n.9 (2005). 
(citing Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 308 (2d Cir. 1963).  MGM 
argued for vicarious liability in the Grokster case, but the U.S. Supreme Court declined to 
address Grokster, et al liability under vicarious liability because it decided the case based on 
inducement theory. 
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infringement.”64  This seems to adopt the theory of inducement of copyright 
infringement adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in MGM v. Grokster.65  In 
this well known case, the Supreme Court held that “one who distributes a 
device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by 
clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement is 
liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties.”66 Ironically, the 
majority opinion goes on to state that inducement theory “premises liability 
on purposeful, culpable expression and conduct, and thus does nothing to 
compromise legitimate commerce or discourage innovation having a lawful 
promise.”67 
Third, footnote 47 states that third party liability applies to one who 
“knowingly and materially aids any act of copyright or related rights 
infringement.”68  This option adopts a theory of contributory infringement, 
which applies when defendants have knowledge of copyright infringement 
by third parties.69 
The footnote goes on to reference “consideration of exceptions or 
limitation to exclusive rights…including fair use, fair dealing, or their 
equivalents.”70  Other paragraphs in Option one and Option two of this 
section are carefully crafted to include exceptions for third party liability in 
cases where the provider does not have actual knowledge of the 
infringement71, or where the provider has taken expeditious action to remove 
or disable access to the infringing activity.72  Noticeably absent from this 
section is any language based on the “staple item of commerce” doctrine, 
known generally as the Sony safe-harbor doctrine.73  The Sony safe-harbor 
doctrine is a defense to contributory copyright infringement when the 
                                                 
64 OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT, Apr. Draft, 
supra note 44. 
65 Grokster, 545 U.S. at 936-37.   
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 937. 
68 OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT, Apr. Draft, 
supra note 44, at footnote 47. 
69 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, 487 F.3d 701, 729 (9th Cir. 2007).  The Supreme Court left 
the question of contributory infringement largely untouched in Grokster (“We do not revisit 
Sony further, as MGM requests, to add a more quantified description of the point of balance 
between protection and commerce when liability rests solely on distribution with knowledge 
that unlawful use will occur.” Grokster at 934.)  Thus, the Ninth Circuit in Perfect 10 found 
that the Supreme Court in Grokster defined two categories of contributory liability: one based 
on encouraging or inducing infringement through specific acts and the second on distributing a 
product that is not capable of substantial noninfringing uses. Perfect 10, 487 F.3d at 727. 
70 OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT, Apr. Draft, 
supra note 44, at footnote 47. 
71 Id. at Art. 2.18 (3)(Option 1). 
72 Id. at (Option 2). 
73 Henning, supra note 12, at 185. 
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defendant can show that the product at issue is capable of “substantial 
noninfringing uses” or “commercially significant noninfringing uses.”74   
Although this part of the April draft certainly incorporates other U.S. theories 
of secondary copyright infringement, it specifically declines to incorporate 
the Sony safe-harbor provision.  However, it does appear that this draft is 
designed to take the full power of the secondary copyright infringement 
theory adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court, and other lower courts, and 
extend that into the legal domain of many of our trading partners.75  Thus, 
copyright owners were perhaps hoping to accomplish in one fell swoop what 
Napster, Grokster, the Berne Convention, WIPO, and TRIPS could not – 
seamless imposition of liability for secondary copyright infringement on an 
international scale. 
In a profound reversal of direction, however, the final text of ACTA 
completely eliminated all references to third party liability. Article 2.18 
instead merely requires that each party provide enforcement procedures to 
permit effective action against infringement with an effective deterrent to 
further infringement.76  This must be perceived as a defeat for copyright 
owners who were hoping for a legal imposition of U.S.-like third party 
liability. 
Another important issue covered in ACTA addresses the obligation of 
ISPs to disclose customer information.  For several years, trade groups, like 
the RIAA and MPAA, would file lawsuits against users, requiring ISPs to 
disclose the identities of customers engaging in file sharing.77  As stated 
earlier, the RIAA abandoned this approach in 2008 and began pursuing 
agreements with ISPs that allowed the ISP to forward an email to the 
customer requesting that they stop uploading illegal content.78  It is unknown 
whether the practice has worked to the satisfaction of the RIAA. 
With regard to ISP responsibility, the April draft of ACTA provided two 
options.  Option one required an ISP or Online Service Provider (OSP) to 
“expeditiously” remove or disable access to material upon receipt of legally 
sufficient notice of infringement or order from a competent authority.79  This 
                                                 
74 Id. 
75 We must assume that this provision also addresses much of the frustration the MPAA/RIAA 
encountered when they attempted to sue and shut down many of the torrent websites which 
were commonly used internationally for copyright infringing activity.  Historically, the MPAA 
and RIAA have had mixed success in shutting down these sites, largely based on the varying 
degrees of copyright infringement protections in various countries. See McBride, supra note 
23. 
76 OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT, Oct. Text, supra 
note 1, at Art. 2.18(1).  
77 McBride, supra note 23.  
78 Id. 
79 According to the leaked ACTA draft, the U.S. proposed the language “legally sufficient 
notice of alleged infringement,” while Mexico proposed the language “order from a competent 
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seems to mirror the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) “notice and 
take-down” provisions.80  The DMCA provides that an ISP will not be held 
liable for copyright infringement if the ISP “acts expeditiously to remove, or 
disable access to” infringing material upon written communication signed by 
the rights holder which: (1) identifies the copyrighted work claimed to have 
been infringed; (2) identifies the material claimed to be infringing with 
location information; (3) gives contact information for the rights holder and 
affirmation of the correctness of the complaint.81 
In addition, Article 2.18 (Option two)(3ter) in the April draft of ACTA 
goes further by allowing a rights holder to expeditiously obtain the identity 
of a subscriber from an ISP/OSP when given effective notification “of 
materials that they claim with valid reasons to be infringing their copyright 
or related rights.”82  This would have preserved the right of U.S. content 
owners to obtain the identity of a subscriber from an ISP.  The issue was how 
those identities would be obtained.  Under the DMCA, a copyright owner can 
obtain the identity of a subscriber from an ISP by filing a request for a 
subpoena with a United States district court.83  For the court to grant the 
subpoena, the rights holder must show the same elements it does for the 
notice and take-down request in §512(c)(3)(A).84  Only upon receipt of the 
subpoena must the ISP disclose the identity of alleged infringer.85  However, 
the ACTA provision in the April draft based release of the identity of an 
alleged infringer simply on “effective notification” to the ISP.86 If this 
standard were adopted, it would apply the notice and take-down remedy of 
the DMCA based on much less than the currently required court subpoena.  
A rights holder would be able to request removal of copyrighted material and 
the identity of the alleged infringer by arguably submitting one request to the 
ISP. If an ISP were required to release personal subscriber information solely 
based on effective notice by a content owner, the due process rights of U.S. 
citizens would be compromised. 
ACTA also proposed an alternative, Article 2.18 Option two (3 quater), 
which encouraged  “mutually supportive relationships between online service 
providers and right holders to deal effectively with…infringement which 
                                                                                                                   
authority.”  See ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT, Jan. Draft, supra note 51, at Art. 
2.18 (3)(b)(ii)(Option 1). 
80 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii) (2010). 
81 Id. at § 512(c)(3)(A). 
82 OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT, Apr. Draft, 
supra note 44, at Art. 2.18 (Option 2)(3ter). 
83 17 U.S.C. § 512(h)(1). 
84 Id. at § 512(h)(4). 
85 Id. at § 512(h)(5). 
86 OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT, Apr. Draft, 
supra note 44, at Art. 2.18 (Option 2)(3ter). 
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takes place by means of the Internet, including the encouragement of 
establishing…actions which should be taken.”87  This option would not run 
afoul of U.S. due process concerns as it allows each Party to develop its own 
guidelines for enforcement. 88 
The final text of ACTA seems to resolve this issue. It provides that the 
parties to ACTA may order an ISP or OSP to expeditiously disclose the 
identity of a subscriber whose account was used for infringement, if the 
rights holder has a “legally sufficient claim of infringement.”89 This standard 
could arguably comport with the DMCA requirements of a subpoena and 
certainly require more than the previously proposed “effective notification” 
standard. It also appears to stop short of the “notice and take down” 
requirements of the DMCA, as the final Consolidated Text merely requires 
that parties “permit effective action against an act of… 
infringement…including expeditious remedies to prevent infringement.”90  
Once again, copyright owners who pushed for the adoption of the DMCA 
take-down provisions and a looser standard for disclosure of customer 
identity information must have been disappointed with the outcome of this 
section of the ACTA. 
 
C. Technological Protection Measures 
 
Digital Rights Management (DRM) uses various technologies, or 
Technological Protection Measures (TPMs), to control access to, and use of, 
digital content.91 It can include various types of technologies, such as 
encryption, copy generation management systems, and digital containers.92  
These systems are integrated into consumer devices in a standardized way 
and sold on the mass-market.  The public availability of these devices has 
allowed hackers to breach the TPMs and infringe upon the intellectual 
property contained therein. 
Two international treaties address TPMs – the 1996 WIPO treaty and 
the 2002 WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT), which prohibit the circumvention 
                                                 
87 Id. at Art. 2.18 (Option 2)(3quater). 
88 An examination of the January 2010 leaked draft seems to indicate that the United States 
proposed the ISP liability standard in Option 1 described above, while Japan proposed the ISP 
liability standard described in Option 2(3 ter) and (3 quater).  A subsequent paragraph notes 
that the U.S. option is not consistent with Japanese law.  See ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE 
AGREEMENT, Jan. Draft, supra note 51.  
89 OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT, Oct. Text, supra 
note 1, at Art. 2.18(4).  
90 Id. at Art. 2.18(1). 
91 Stefan Bechtold, Digital Rights Management in the United States and Europe, 52 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 323, 326 (2004). 
92 Id. at 326-27. 
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of technological measures used to protect copyrighted works.93  Specifically, 
the WCT requires that signatories provide “adequate legal protection and 
effective legal remedies against circumvention,”94 leaving the door open for 
signatory countries to fashion their own remedial schemes.95  In contrast, the 
DMCA, as codified in Title 17 §1201, expands copyright law in four ways: 
 
1. It creates a claim for unauthorized access to works of authorship; 
2. It makes distributors of circumvention devices liable for the 
dissemination of the means to gain unauthorized access; 
3. It makes distributors of circumvention devices directly liable for the 
dissemination of the means to make copies or to engage in 
communication to the public; 
4. It makes disseminators of both kinds of devices liable even if some 
of the end users to whom the devices are distributed would employ 
the devices for non-infringing purposes.96 
 
The scheme and penalties for circumvention of TPM is much more restrictive 
under the DMCA than it is under the WCT.  The April draft of ACTA Article 
2.18(4) followed the DMCA much more closely than the WCT.  It provided 
for civil and criminal penalties in “appropriate cases of willful conduct,”97 
while the WCT does not require criminal penalties.  Much like the DMCA, it 
also required protection for TPMs that control access to works of 
authorship.98 It also contained DMCA-like prohibitions on both the 
manufacture and distribution of circumvention devices. 
The final ACTA text removed the provision for criminal penalties and 
has now adopted the WCT standard of providing “adequate legal protection 
and effective legal remedies.”99 There is no longer a specific reference 
regarding access to works of authorship; however, the final text did maintain 
the DMCA-like prohibition on manufacture and distribution of 
circumvention devices.100  There is some concern that the USTR adopted the 
                                                 
93 Id. at 331. 
94 WIPO Copyright Treaty, art. 11, Dec. 20, 1996, WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/94, 
http://wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/trtdocs_wo033.html. 
95 See Jane Ginsburg, Legal Protection of Technological Measures Protecting Works of 
Authorship: International Obligations and the US Experience, 29 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS11, 20 
(2005)(“Article 11 does not instruct member States regarding the nature of the sanction for 
violating the anti-circumvention norm.”). 
96 Id. at 23. 
97 OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT, Apr. Draft, 
supra note 44, at Art. 2.18(4). 
98 Id. at Art. 2.18(4)(a).  This provision is in brackets, meaning it is still under discussion. 
99 WIPO Copyright Treat, supra note 94. 
100 OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT, Apr. Draft, 
supra note 44, at Art. 2.18(6). 
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strict TPM provisions in the DMCA, but failed to adopt any of the exceptions 
to the anti-circumvention provisions.101  The final text of ACTA does allow 
for appropriate limitations or exceptions and is not intended to prejudice 
copyright defenses under a Party’s law.102  This would allow the DMCA 
exceptions for U.S. companies; however, it may create problems for U.S. 
companies if other ACTA parties have not adopted the same exceptions 
allowed under the DMCA. Thus, at least one group has suggested that 
ACTA’s apparent obligation to adopt the DMCA’s TPM provisions will 
allow the United States to achieve what it has only been able to do through 
bilateral free trade agreements.103 
 
D. Is this ACTA Legal? 
 
Section 301 of the 1984 Trade & Tariff Act gives the President of the 
United States the authority to deal with states that fail to provide adequate 
and effective protection for U.S. intellectual property rights.104  If a foreign 
country fails to provide protection for U.S. intellectual property, the 
President can authorize withdrawal of trade benefits or impose duties on 
goods.105  This is likely the basis under which the USTR has proceeded with 
such a sweeping plurilateral trade agreement as ACTA. Professors Goldsmith 
and Lessig argue that ACTA should be submitted for Senate approval as a 
treaty, or to Congress as a “congressional-executive” agreement.106  
However, the Obama Administration, through the USTR, has at least 
suggested that it will adopt ACTA as a “sole executive agreement”, which 
only requires presidential approval.107  Since the Constitution, Article 1, §8 
gives Congress the power to protect intellectual property and regulate foreign 
commerce, it seems that interpreting ACTA as a sole executive agreement 
exceeds Constitutional authority and precedent. 
                                                 
101 Section 1201 of the DMCA contains exceptions for encryption research, security testing, 
interoperability, and others.  See 17 U.S.C. §1201 (d-j).  
102 OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT, Apr. Draft, 
supra note 44, at Art. 2.18(8). 
103 Gwen Hinze, Preliminary Analysis of the Officially Released ACTA Text, ELECTRONIC 
FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Apr. 22, 2010), http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/04/eff-analysis-
officially-released-acta-text. 
104 OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., SPECIAL 301 REPORT (2004-2006), 
http://ipjustice.org/USTR/USTR_Section_301_Reports.htm. 
105 Id. 
106 Jack Goldsmith & Lawrence Lessig, Anti-Counterfeiting Agreement Raises Constitutional 
Concerns, WASH. POST, Mar. 26, 2010, at A23. 
107 Id. 
286/Vol. XXI/Southern Law Journal 
 
An alternative view, and perhaps the one adopted by the USTR, is that 
the Treaty Power108 can be used to give Congress a legislative source of 
authority independent of its Article I powers.109  Professor Dinwoodie has 
argued, “the Treaty Clause may offer lawmaking authority in the 
international arena, with local effects, in ways that do not exist under the 
Copyright Clause with respect to purely local regulations.”110  This could be 




One must assume that the USTR has acted in the interests of the U.S. 
copyright holders, making concerted attempts to move other countries toward 
U.S. standards of copyright infringement and enforcement. There are obvious 
reasons why the United States government would be interested in enforcing 
U.S. copyright laws.  It certainly serves the interests of many U.S. companies 
that lose billions of dollars a year from piracy of software, copyrighted, and 
patented goods.112  No one could question that the United States has a 
legitimate interest in this regard. 
The strategy and best interests of the content owners can be seen in the 
proposed provisions of the earlier versions of ACTA. Some of these 
provisions included the inducement theory of secondary liability, as well as 
the failure to include fair use, safe harbor, and other exceptions to the 
criminal and civil liability sections.  Still other provisions placed third party 
liability on ISPs to release customer identity information, remove 
information, and even terminate Internet access upon mere notice of 
infringement.   
With the combined efforts of the federal government in its trade 
negotiations, G8 support, civil lawsuits against torrent trackers, and criminal 
and civil lawsuits against individual users, it may appear that the content 
owners are slowly winning the fight to stop internet piracy. ACTA was 
                                                 
108 Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution gives the President the power to make treaties with 
the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate. See, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
109 Caroline Nguyen, Note: Expansive Copyright Protection for all Time? Avoiding Article I 
Horizontal Limitations through the Treaty Power, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1079, 1111 (2006). 
110 Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Symposium: Constitutional Challenges to Copyright: Copyright 
Lawmaking Authority: An (Inter)Nationalist Perspective on the Treaty Clause, 30 COLUM. J.L. 
& ARTS 355, 375 (2007). 
111 Much could be said with regard to the Treaty Power and the writings of recent scholars on 
its relevance to copyright law; however, such discussion is beyond the scope of this paper. 
112 IP theft networks have caused commercial losses of US $500 billion. See Charles R. 
McManis, The Proposed Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA): Two Tales of a 
Treaty, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 1235, 1245 (2009). 
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clearly designed to bolster the efforts of content owners by providing some 
level of “super-TRIPS” enforcement for copyright infringement. 
However, the secretive earlier drafts of ACTA caused outrage among 
many public interest groups.  In 2008, several public interest groups filed two 
separate Freedom of Information Act requests for the text of ACTA, both of 
which were denied by the White House. Subsequently, the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation and Public Knowledge filed a Freedom of Information 
Act lawsuit against the USTR to compel the release of the ACTA document 
but later dismissed the lawsuit.113  Even Senator Ron Wyden sent a letter to 
the USTR in January, 2010 requesting clarification on the purpose and scope 
of the ACTA negotiations.114  In addition, there have been many articles, 
blogs, and even a facebook page devoted to defeating ACTA. 
Perhaps it was the tide of public opinion that swayed the United States 
to relent in its pursuit of tougher copyright enforcement provisions in ACTA.  
Perhaps it became clear in later negotiating rounds that all of the parties 
would not be able to agree on standards that exceeded the TRIPS agreement.  
Ultimately, it remains to be seen whether the Executive Branch intends to use 
its powers – like the Treaty Power – to do what content owners have been 
largely unable to do for years in their efforts to protect their intellectual 
property rights.  Surely legal challenges will come if the USTR and the 
Executive Branch pursue the use of the Treaty Clause as an “end run” around 
the Constitution.  The USTR may have been in the position to force U.S. 
copyright standards onto anyone who wants to do business with the United 
States – a ruthless endeavor – but for now, the final product of ACTA may 
end up being toothless indeed. 
  
                                                 
113 Grant Gross, supra note 38. 
114 Letter from Senator Ron Wyden to US Trade Rep., Jan. 6, 2010available at 
http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/Wyden_Letter_to_USTR_on_ACTA_Jan_2010.pdf. 
